art and disrupting entrapment

I had a similarly (to Lizzie) skeptical reaction to Heidegger’s turn to art. I’d be curious to look at Heidegger pre-1944/45 and his philosophical connections to Nazism; I’m guessing he would have come to different conclusions regarding technology (does anyone know, had he written about technology before?) Let’s spread our blame around to some ideologues (If nowhere else we see in Nobles the feedback between ideology and the operation of political machinery).
I am certainly not defending Heidegger, but I think we can get something useful out of his take on art. If we understand the “essence of art” that technology threatens but also forces us to turn to be something more fundamental than ‘the arts’ as a discipline (I think this is what Heidegger is talking about, just like we’re supposed to look at technology as the kind of approach to truth where we reveal things as standing-reserve, not just look at it as technological machinery), if we understand art as “the revealing that brings forth truth into radiant appearance” - then maybe we can rewrite art as things like partisans (using stolen guns and improvised explosives) blowing up Nazi supply trains (or maybe even all those trains carrying IBM census cards) - “in our sheer aesthetic-mindedness we no longer guard and preserve the coming to presence of art.”
I’d like to look at different kinds of disruptions of entrapment. What does passing do to the census? How does that change when we bring lynching back into the picture? (conspicuously absent as it is from Nobles’ chapter)